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Abstract
In this paper we examine the consequences of a decrease in exits
of older workers on youth employment, allowing for job-to-job ows.
We distinguish between young workers with no experience and experi-
enced workers and we consider jobs with di¤erent experience require-
ments. Using a theoretical matching model with heterogeneous jobs
and workers, we point out that a fall in the exit rate of older workers
increases job-to-job ows, which makes rms more reluctant to open
jobs for young workers. Then, we provide some empirical evidence for
the Italian case.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, most European countries experienced an ageing
of their population and a fall in the labor force participation of older workers.
In the face of steadily increasing dependency rates, some countries raised their
legal retirement age to balance the budget of their pay-as-you-go retirement
schemes. However, the e¢ ciency of such a policy option depends strongly
on its impact on the hiring rate and employment among every age group of
workers and particularly the young workers.
At rst sight, we can think that an increase in legal retirement age,
encouraging rms to maintain their ageing workforce, could slowdown the
dynamics of new hirings, if rms were expected to squeeze out their older
workers and to replace them by new young workers. However, this simplistic
idea, that led to the creation of early retirement schemes, has been severely
criticized over the past ten years. Following the idea of Bozio (2006) we may
argue that young and older workers may be imperfectly substitutable in the
labor market. Consequently, once an older worker retires, his job can not be
lled by a young worker. We can discuss about what makes these two cohorts
of workers imperfectly substitutable. Cadiou et al. (2002) highlight the fact
that the low job nding rates among young workers and among older workers
are not of the same nature. While the low hiring rate of senior workers is due
to the fact that they are close to the retirement age1, the low job nding
rate for young workers stems from their lack of experience. Consequently,
they can not ll a job requiring some professional experience to replace an
older worker retired.
However, even though the two sorts of jobs for the young and the old
generation of workers di¤er greatly in the set of skill and experience require-
ments, a reduction in exits of older workers after an increase in the retirement
age may have a negative impact on the hiring rate of young workers through
a vacancy-chain e¤ect (Contini and Revelli, 1997). The idea is the following:
if we consider within a local labor market2, that a vacancy opens up when
an older worker leaves his job, there is a non-negative probability that it
will be lled by an employed job-seeker (attracted by better opportunities or
higher wage), who accumulated a su¢ cient level of experience to replace the
1See also Chéron et al. (2007) for this question
2A local labour market is a group of rms belonging to the same sector of activity,
located in the same area and whose jobs require the same educational level
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older worker and whose job requires less professional experience. Therefore,
after this job-to job ow, a new vacancy opens up and may be lled by an-
other young employed job-seeker, involving again job-to-job ows, that may
result nally in hiring a young worker from out of the local labor market.
So, holding job creation constant and considering a vacancy-chain pattern,
retaining older workers in the labor force leads to fewer complex vacant jobs,
i.e. vacant jobs requiring some professional experience, which reduces job to
job ows and decreases the number of vacant jobs requiring no experience.
As a result, job nding rates of young workers are negatively a¤ected.
For this idea to be relevant, two conditions are needed. First, the economy
has to be characterised by a large share of job-to-job transitions in the total
number of separations. Second, job creation has to be uncorrelated with
a variation in the exit rates of older workers. Regarding the rst condition,
recent empirical studies highlight the major role of job-to-job ows to explain
the total labour market turnover. In the case of the US labor market, Nagypal
(2003) reports that job to job transitions account for more than 50% of the
total separations of workers with a college degree and for more than 30%
of separations of workers without a college degree. Regarding the European
case, Theodossiou and Zangelis (2007) report cross-country evidence on job
to job transitions for 6 European countries and they nd that job to job
ows account for up to 17% of total separations in the di¤erent European
economies considered. So it appears that workers in Europe are less mobile
than in the US labor market. Nevertheless, in Italy, Contini and Rapiti
(1994) show that job to job transitions are about 25% of total separations.
The Italian labor market can therefore be characterized by a large share of
job to job transitions.
The second condition requires job creation to be exogenous. As argued
by Layard, et al. (1991), it seems unrealistic and they refer to this idea as
a lump-of-labor fallacy. Indeed, job creation is expected to be a¤ected by a
change in the exit rate of older workers, so we can not view the number of
jobs in the economy as a xed stock. One rst goal of this paper is to predict
the e¤ect of delaying retirement on youth employment using the vacancy-
chain setting and allowing for endogenous job creation. Using a theoretical
matching model "à la" Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), Chéron et al. (2007)
already pointed out that there exists a positive relation between the distance
from retirement age and the hiring rate. This result implies that postponing
retirement has a positive horizon e¤ect on the hiring rate of each group of
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workers, including the young workers. Nevertheless, while it is clear that the
distance from retirement strongly a¤ects job nding rates of older workers, it
is less straightforward that it plays a signicative role in the determination
of job opportunities for young workers.
Our theoretical contribution is to investigate the e¤ect of a decrease in
the exit rate of older workers on the hiring rate among young workers, using
a matching model with heterogeneous jobs and workers3 and considering two
types of workers, workers with experience and young workers with no expe-
rience and two types of jobs, jobs requiring experience and jobs requiring
no experience. Through this theoretical model, we represent an overlapping
labour markets economy in the sense of Sattinger (2006), where new young
entrants into a local labor market can not be matched with complex jobs
requiring experience. However, as we allow for job-to-job ows, some experi-
enced workers may be mismatched with jobs requiring no experience. These
workers are therefore looking for a complex job due to better wage o¤ers.
In this framework we show that a decrease in the exit rate of older workers
leads to an intensication of job-to-job ows from simple to complex jobs
and reduces the ow value of a simple job to an employer. Consequently, it
reduces the creation of simple jobs and exerts a negative e¤ect on the job
nding rate of young workers with no experience.
Then, in the second part of the paper, we provide some evidence of neg-
ative e¤ects of retaining older workers in the labor force on the hiring rate
of young workers at a local labor market level, examining the Italian case
given that in this country job to job ows account for a large share of total
worker ows. While the relation between elderly labor force participation
and youth employment has been widely studied at a country-level (Bozio et
al., 2008, Jousten et al., 2009), too few empirical studies have been carried
out in a microeconomic perspective. However, as worker and job ows are
strongly a¤ected by rm-specic variables (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999), it
is interesting to investigate the e¤ect of a slowdown in exits of older work-
ers on the hiring rate of young workers at the rm-level, controling for all
regressors that may a¤ect job creation.
However, such a study raises an empirical issue due to the endogeneity of
the variation in exit rates of older workers. To address this issue, Portugal
et al. (2009) investigate the e¤ect of a decrease in the exit rate of elderly,
3For similar specication see also Dolado et al., 2009, Gautier 2002, Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999, Albrecht and Vroman, 1999
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due to an increase in the legal retirement age for women, on worker ows of
di¤erent age groups, using detailed matched employer-employee Portuguese
data. Their empirical methodology lies on a quasi-experiment given the
fact that only women have been a¤ected by the retirement reform. Using a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence matching method (Heckman, 1997), they show that
rms employing women treated by the reform hire one to two fewer workers
for each senior retained after the increase in legal retirement age and this
decrease in the hiring rate is particularly strong for younger workers.
Our paper is close to the spirit of their study. Indeed, our goal is to
examine the e¤ect of a fall in the exit rate of older workers on the hiring
rate of young workers, using Italian matched employer-employee data from
the Worker Histories Italian Panel and considering the period 1988-1989.
Nevertheless, our paper di¤ers from the study of Portugal et al. for two
reasons: rst, we do not consider rms but rather local labor markets, using
a synthetic-rm approach to account for job-to-job ows, that represent the
starting point of the vacancy-chain theory. Second we do not exploit a quasi-
experiment. We examine the period 1988-1989 given the fact that after 1990,
the Italian labor market has been severely a¤ected by changes in employment
legislation (Kugler and Pica, 2008), then it has been hit by a severe recession
and after 1997, job creation has been strongly inuenced by the introduction
of temporary contracts and of other atypical contracts by the Treu reform,
making the Italian labor market more exible (Sciulli, 2006). So, we choose
to study the period 1988-1989 to be able to isolate the e¤ect on hirings of
young workers due to a fall in exits of older workers from e¤ects due to other
institutional e¤ects or to economic uctuations. However, we are faced with
a selection bias, in the sense that local labor markets with di¤erent exit rates
of elderly may also di¤er in their characteristics likely to a¤ect the accession
rate of young workers.
In the empirical part of the paper, we proceed in two steps. In a rst
step, we view a fall in the exit rate of older workers as a binary treatment
and we examine the average e¤ect of the treatment on the treated, using
a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator to provide some preliminary results that
are not robust to the selection bias. In a second step, we view a fall in the
exit rate of older workers as a continuous treatment4, and we control for the
4Actually, we consider the absolute value of the decrease in the exit rate of older
workers. Consequently, an high value of the treatment means that the observation unit
experienced a severe fall in the exit rate of older workers
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selection bias given observables using propensity score matching methods,
generalized in a setting with a continuous treatment (Hirano and Imbens,
2004). After correcting for the selection bias we nd that the higher the fall
in exits of older workers, the less hirings of young workers.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: in section
2, we develop our theoretical model and we present our theoretical ndings.
Then, in section 3, we present our empirical study, describing the type of
data used, explaining our methodology and presenting our empirical results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The theoretical model: A labor market with
heterogeneous jobs and workers
Following the wide literature about skilled and unskilled workers, we consider
a theoretical model with two sorts of workers and two kinds of jobs. But in
the contrary of the standard literature, we distinguish workers according to
their professional experience and not according to their educational level. To
allow for job-to-job ows, we focus on a local labor market where all rms
belong to the same sector of activity, are located in the same area and whose
jobs require the same educational level. In our model, we consider the young
workers, that we denote by ne as subscript, who entry into the labor market
with no professional experience and the workers with experience, denoted by
e as subscript. We assume that a number 0 of young workers exogenously
arrive in the labor market as unemployed. They can only apply for jobs
requiring no experience. In the remainder of the paper, we denote this type
of jobs by S (simple job) as upscript. In our model, once a young is hired,
he accumulates professional experience and can reach a su¢ cient experience
level at a Poisson arrival rate  to apply for complex jobs, denoted by the
upscript C. Workers have interest to apply for complex jobs to have better
wage opportunities, given that in our model, the wage received by a worker
occupying a simple job is assumed to be the minimum wage5.
5See also Belan et al. (2007) for a similar specication
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Both types of jobs may be broken up in the case of an idiosyncratic
shock, according to a Poisson process with an arrival rate . In that case, a
worker who occupied the job becomes unemployed but keeps his experience
level. Indeed, whatever the unemployment duration of a worker, his working
experience remains the same over time. Furthermore, as we introduce on-
the-job search, workers with experience may always have interest to search
for a simple job, implying a cross-skill equilibrium contrarily to the paper of
Albrecht and Vroman (2002)6.
Following the Behaghels specication (2007), we consider a guillotine
retirement age, introducing a nite horizon in the career of worker7. We
consider that a worker can retire as soon as he accumulates a su¢ cient ex-
perience level to apply for complex jobs. Let  the Poisson arrival rate at
which an experienced worker retires.The horizon H of an experienced worker
is dened in the following way:
H =
Z 1
0
te tdt =
1

(1)
Consequently, a decrease in  lengthens the career of an experienced
worker. In the remainder of the paper, we assimilate a decrease in  to
an increase in the retirement age.
Our specication is twofold: rst, it allows us to reproduce the life cycle
of a worker, who arrives in the labor market with no experience and who
has to accumulate a su¢ cient level of experience occupying simple jobs to
apply for complex jobs. Second, we build an economy with overlapping labor
markets (Sattinger, 2006) in which young workers can not be matched with
jobs requiring experience. Through this theoretical framework, we introduce
an imperfect substitution between a worker occupying a complex job who
retires and a young worker. Our aim is to study the e¤ect of a decrease in
the exit rate of older workers, that is , on hirings of young workers.
In our model we assume that search is undirected, so workers have perfect
information about the type of new vacancies but employers can not target
6Contrarily to their paper, we dene the skill level of a worker by his experience level
7The implications of a nite horizon in a matching model on job creation and job
destruction have been already investigated by Cheron et al. (2006 and 2007)
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their hirings to a special type of workers8. In our economy, vacancies of
type S and the two types of workers (with or without experience) meet each
other according to a matching function denoted by hS(une + ue; vS), that
determines the number of hirings for this kind of jobs as a function of the
number ui of unemployed of type i, with i 2 fne; eg , and of the number of
vacancies vS of type S. We assume that the matching function is increasing,
concave and linear homogenous.
An employer opening a S-type vacancy may ll his job according to a
Poisson process at an arrival rate hS( 1
S
; 1) = q(S). q(S) is decreasing with
the tightness on the simple job market, denoted by S, equal to the number
of S-type vacancies over the number of job-seekers. We deduce therefore
that an unemployed worker (whatever his type) may be matched with a
simple job according to a Poisson process at an arrival rate p(S), such that
p(S) = Sq(S) . p(S) is therefore increasing with S.
In a similar way, vacancies of type C meet job seekers with experience
according to a matching function denoted by hC(ue+oe; vC), that determines
the number of hirings for this kind of jobs as a function of the number ue
of unemployed workers with experience, of the number oe of employed job
seekers and of the number vC of C-type vacancies. Consequently, a C-type
vacancy may be matched with a job seeker according to a Poisson process
at an arrival rate hC( 1
C
; 1) = q(C). This arrival rate is decreasing with
the tightness in the complex jobs market C , equal to the number of C-
type vacancies over the number of job seekers with experience. We deduce
therefore that an experienced job-seeker may nd a complex job according
to a Poisson process at an arrival rate p(C) = Cq(C) increasing with C .
The gure 1 represents the worker ows in our model. The dashed ar-
row indicates job-to-job ows. Flow equations at steady-state allow us to
determine the labor force structure at the local labor market level.
We nd the six following steady-state ow equations:
(ue + oe)p(
C) = EC( + ) (2)
8However, in the case of complex jobs, employers are sure to be matched with only
workers with experience, given that youngsters can not apply for this type of jobs.
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Experienced workers
employed in complex jobs
Unemployed
Experienced workers
Workers without experience
employed in a simple job
Unemployed workers without
experience
Retirement
Experienced workers
employed in a simple job
Figure 1: Worker ows in a local labor market
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(EC + oe) = ue[ + p(
S) + p(C)] (3)
uep(
S) + ESne = oe[ +  + p(
C)] (4)
unep(
S) = ESne( + ) (5)
ESne + 0 = unep(
S) (6)
0 = (ue + oe + E
C
e ) (7)
where ue and oe represent respectively the number of experienced job-
seekers unemployed and employed, ESne and Ee refer respectively to the num-
ber of workers with no experience occupying a simple job and to the number
of experienced workers occupying a complex job and 0 represent the number
of young workers who arrive in the labor market.
Combining equations (5) and (6) we obtain the expression of the number
of unemployed workers with no experience:
une =
0( + )
p(S)
(8)
Furthermore, combining the equations (3) and (7) we deduce the expres-
sion of unemployment for experienced workers:
ue =
0
[ + p(S) + p(C) + ]
(9)
The equation (8) is quite intuitive. The youth unemployment increases
with the number of new entrants into the labor market and decreases with
their probability to nd a simple job denoted by p(S). Our theoretical
model allows us to endogenize this probability as a function of the tightness
S, depending on the simple-job creation behaviour of employers. As this
behaviour may be strongly inuenced by the horizon of workers, our approach
allows us to investigate theoretically the channels through which a decrease in
the exit rate  has an impact on hirings of young workers with no experience.
In the next subsection, we represent the job creation decision of rms.
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2.1 The rmsbehaviour
In our model, for a sake of simplicity, each rm can not open more than
one job. As long as the job is vacant, the rm pays a search cost ci that
depends on the type of job opened (i 2 fS;Cg). When a rm decides to
open a S-type vacancy, it may be lled by a young worker with no experience
according to a Poisson process at an arrival rate q(S), where  is the share
of unemployed workers with no experience over the whole unemployment,
namely  = une=(une + ue). In a similar way, a S-type vacancy may be lled
by an experienced job seeker according to a Poisson process at an arrival
rate (1   )q(S). At the steady-state equilibrium, the ow value V S to
an employer from opening a S-type vacancy satises the following Bellman
equation:
rV S =  cS + q(S)[(JSne   V S) + (1  )(JSe   V S)] (10)
where JSi is the ow value to a rm of a simple job lled by a worker of
type i, with i 2 fne; eg.
Furthermore, the ow value V C to a rm which opens a C-type vacancy
is dened by the following Bellman equation :
rV C =  cC + q(C)(JC   V C) (11)
where JC is the ow value to an employer of a lled complex job. We
assume that rms are free to entry the market. Consequently, at steady-state
equilibrium all prots from opening a new vacancy are exhausted for the two
sorts of jobs, which implies the following free-entry condition :
V C = V S = 0 (12)
In the submarket of simple jobs, a rm opening a S-type job vacancy may
either recruit a unexperienced unemployed worker or an experienced one. Let
JSi be the present ow value from hiring a worker of type i, with i 2 fne; eg.
We assume that both types of workers have the same productivity on the
same type of job. However, an experienced worker can quit his job to nd a
complex job at a Poisson arrival rate p(C) and can also retire at a Poisson
arrival rate , contrarily to workers with no experience.
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Borrowing the idea of Belan et al. (2007), we assume that each worker oc-
cupying a simple job receives a minimum wage w. Consequently, the present
values of expected prot to a rm from a simple job lled either with a worker
with no experience or with an experienced worker satisfy the following Bell-
man equations:
rJSne = y
S   w + (V S   JSne) + (JSe   JSne) (13)
And :
rJSe = y
S   w + [ +  + p(C)](V S   JSe ) (14)
Furthermore, when an experienced job seeker nds a complex job, he
starts producing an output yC > yS and he receives a wage wC > w. This
part aims at providing a theoretical intuition, so we focus on the wage-
posting equilibrium. His job may break up for two reasons. First, it is
hit by an idiosyncratic shock at a Poisson arrival rate  and the worker gets
into unemployment. Second, the worker retires at an arrival rate . So, the
ow value to a rm from a lled complex job satises the following Bellman
equation:
rJC = yC   wC + ( + )(V C   JC) (15)
2.2 Wage posting equilibrium
We determine the steady-state equilibrium. Combining the Bellman equation
(10) and the free-entry condition we obtain the following expression:
JSne + (1  )JSe =
cS
q(S)
(16)
Substituting the equations (13) and (14) into the expression (16) we get
the following relation between S et C :

(r +  + )
[(yS   w) + [y
S   w]
[r +  + p(C) + ]
] +
(1  )(yS   w)
[r +  + p(C) + ]
=
cS
q(S)
(17)
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Furthermore, substituting the Bellman equation (15) in the expression
(11) and using the free-entry condition, we obtain the following expression:
cC
q(C)
=
(yC   wC)
(r +  + )
(18)
To determine the e¤ect of a decrease in  on job creation for each type of
job, we use specic functional form to describe the two matching processes.
We assume as in the standard literature that each matching function is Cobb-
Douglas with an elasticity equal to  = 0; 5, such that:
hS(une + ue; v
S) = (une + ue)
1
2 (vS)
1
2 (19)
hC(ue + oe; v
C) = (ue + oe)
1
2 (vC)
1
2 (20)
Substituting (20) into (18), we obtain the following expression:
(C) =

(yC   wC)
cC(r +  + )
2
(21)
Consequently, through our theoretical model, we can write the tightness
for the submarket of complex jobs as a function of only exogenous parameters.
This expression shows us clearly that a decrease in the exit rate among older
workers denoted by  fosters the creation of complex jobs. Our result is in
accordance with ndings of Chéron et al. (2007) that highlight a positive
horizon e¤ect of an increase in the retirement age on job creation. However,
in this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of a decrease in the exit rate among
older workers on hirings of young workers. We mention previously that young
workers can not apply for complex jobs so we have to determine the e¤ect of
a decrease in  on the creation of simple jobs, that is on S.
Substituting (21) into (17), we nd that at steady-state equilibrium, S
satises the following equation:
L(S; ) =

(r +  + )
[(yS   w) + [y
S   w]
[r +  +
h
(yC wC)
cC(r++)
i
+ ]
] +
(1  )(yS   w)
[r +  +
h
(yC wC)
cC(r++)
i
+ ]
  c
S
q(S)
= 0 (22)
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In the wage posting equilibrium, we nd two main o¤setting e¤ects of a
decrease in the exit rate among older workers denoted by  on the tightness
for the submarket of simple jobs S. On the one hand, a decrease in 
raises the horizon of experienced workers and therefore increases the average
duration of simple jobs, which encourages employers to open more simple
jobs. On the other hand, a decrease in  has a negative e¤ect on S through
job-to-job ows. This is the key e¤ect that we highlight in our model. Indeed,
given that the creation of complex jobs is fostered by a decrease in , the
probability for an experimented worker occupying a simple job to be matched
with a complex job is higher. Consequently, the average duration of simple
jobs decreases and rms are more reluctant to open such jobs, reducing hiring
of young workers.
Nevertheless, recall that the share of unemployed workers without experi-
ence denoted by  is given by our ow equations at steady-state and therefore
it is a function of both S and C . Indeed, combining equations (8) and (9),
we write  in the following way:
 =
( + )[ + p(S) + p(C) + ]
[ + p(S) + p(C) + ]( + ) + p(S)
We see that the expression of  is quite complicated and depends both
on S and C . So it is not so straightforward to examine the sign of the
derivative of S with respect to .
Proposition 1 In the wage posting equilibrium, a decrease in  reduces
S,i.e @
S
@
> 0 only if yC   wC > cC(r +  + )2
Proof. See Appendix
We have shown theoretically that a decrease in the exit rate among older
workers within a local labor market may reduce the tightness S and there-
fore it has a negative e¤ect on the hiring rate p(S) of young unemployed
workers, provided that the ow value to an employer of a lled complex job is
su¢ ciently high. Thus, when this condition holds, the horizon e¤ect is o¤set
by the indirect e¤ect due to job-to-job ows. Given the expression of une
we deduce that a fall in the exit rate  raises unemployment among young
workers with no experience.
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3 The empirical study
3.1 The data
For our empirical study, we use matched employer-employee data from the
Worker Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) a database built by the University of
Turin in cooperation with the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS).
The original data set collects social security forms of a 1/90 random sample
of employees every year. It provides accurate information about the employ-
ment spells of each worker. The data also includes also longitudinal records
for rms employing the randomly selected workers in the sample. However,
the data from the WHIP does not provide information about all individu-
als who work in a rm, so we can not observe the distribution of individual
characteristics for each rm of the sample. To adress this issue, we carry out
our study at the local labor market level, given that each observation unit is
made up of a group of rms belonging to the same sector of activity, located
in the same area and whose jobs require the same educational level.
We can discuss our synthetic-rm approach. Indeed, it leads us to un-
derestimate the variance of each rm characteristic between rms given that
each observation unit is a group of rms. To test the relevance of this ap-
proach, Contini et al. (2008) investigate the wage dynamics in the province of
Veneto, confronting the results obtained through the synthetic-rm method
with those obtained through an analysis at the rm-level. They conclude
that both approaches lead to similar results when the number of rms in
each local labor market is quite small (between 50 and 95 rms per observa-
tion unit). Consequently, there is a trade-o¤ when choosing the agregation
level between having the nest grid and having a su¢ cient number of rms
in each observation unit.
Furthermore, studying the mobility of workers at a synthetic-rm-level
allows us to account for the job-to-job ows that account for the major part
of the worker ows observed in Italy. Using data from the WHIP, Leombruni
and Quaranta (2005) show that job-to-job ows in the Italian labor market
are observed within a sector, and within a geographical area. Consequently,
we choose to agregate our data by province and by sector of activity, and
we end up with a sample of 517 synthetic rms. Studying the mobility of
workers at a local labor market level, allows us to account for the vacancy-
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chain pattern and we can expect that exits of older workers may imply hirings
of young workers, holding job creation constant.
Our empirical analysis aims at investigating the e¤ect of a decrease in
the exit rate among older workers on the hiring rate of the young, during the
period 1988-1989. Here, the exit rate of older workers is dened as the number
of exits of older workers observed in a year over the stock of older workers
employed in the start of the year. In addition, the hiring rate of young workers
is dened as the number of hirings of young workers observed in a year over
the stock of young workers employed in the end of this year. We choose this
period given that since 1990, employment protection legislation has been
severely changed and has had a strong e¤ect on the Italian labour market
(Kugler and Pica, 2008). Moreover, since 1993, the Italian labour market
has been strongly a¤ected by the economic recession. At last, since 1997, the
Treu reform liberalized the use of temporary contracts and introduced new
atypical contracts, involving a strong e¤ect on Italian worker ows (Sciulli,
2006).
Consequently, we study the period 1988-1989 to isolate the e¤ect on youth
employment due to a slowdown in the exit rate among older workers from
other e¤ects due to institutional changes or to economic uctuations. How-
ever, even during the period 1988-1989, job creation among young workers
has been increased by the introduction of CFL (Contratto Formazione e La-
voro)9 contracts (Tattara and Valentini, 2005). To control for this e¤ect, we
include in our set of regressors the share of CFL contracts observed in each
local labour market.
As mentioned in the introduction, we carry out our empirical study in
two steps. In the rst step, we consider a binary variable equal to one if
the observation unit experienced a reduction in the exit rate of workers aged
50 or more between 1988 and 1989 and we study the e¤ect of this dummy
on the hiring rate of young workers aged 30 or less in 1989. In a second
step, we include in our sample only the treated observations and we examine
to what extent a fall in the exit rate among older workers a¤ect hirings of
young workers. In this step, we view the absolute value of the decrease in
the exit rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989 as the continuous
treatment. For some descriptive statistics, we group our treated observations
9The CFL is a xed-term contract with a maximum duration of 24 months not re-
newable. This contract was introduced in 1984 to easy the entrance of youngsters aged
between 15 and 29 into the labour market, providing scal benets to rms hiring young
people.
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into two categories: the group 1 is made up of synthetic rms, in which the
value of the continuous treatment is lower than the median level, that is
13.5% and the group 2 is composed of synthetic rms, in which the value
of the treatment exceeds 13.5%. We observe in the table 1 that the average
hiring rate of young workers is higher in the group 1 (around 54,58%) than in
the group 2 (around 51,57%). So a strong slowdown in the exit rate among
older workers may reduce new hirings of young workers.
Table 1: Average hiring rate among workers aged 30 or less for di¤erent
values of the continuous treatment.
Group 1 Group 2 Total
Average hiring rate
among young workers 54.58% 51.57% 53.07%
Number of observations 117 117 234
Note : The group 1 is composed of synthetic rms that experienced a decrease in the exit
rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989 lower than 13.5% in absolute value.
The group 2 is composed of synthetic rms that experienced a decrease in the exit rate
among older workers between 1988 and 1989 higher than 13.5% in absolute value.
Source : WHIP (waves 1988-1989)
To control for potential composition e¤ects likely to inuence the hiring
rate of young workers or the exit rate of older workers observed within a local
labor market, we use the set of information provided by our panel matched
employer-employee data. We include rst the age structure of each synthetic
rms controling for the share of younger workers and of older workers in
each local labor market. We add also the share of women to test for gender-
specic e¤ects. We also introduce the average ratio between the average wage
of young workers and the average wage of older workers in each synthetic rm.
Indeed, this ratio may have a strong e¤ect on the substitutability between
young and older workers. We include also the share of CFL contracts signed
in each local labor market, following empirical results supporting evidence of
the strong positive impact of these contracts on youth employment (Tattara
and Valentini, 2005).
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Furthermore, empirical study of Contini et al. (2002) show that the age
or the size of the rm a¤ect the workersmobility. Consequently, in our set
of regressors, we include the share of young rms (less than 8 years) and
the share of small rms (less than 9 workers) in each local labor market.
To control for a potential e¤ect due to economic trends in each synthetic
rm, we add in our set of explantory variables the unemployment rate and
a dummy equal to one if the local labor market is declining10. We provide
some descriptive statistics in the table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the years 1988 and 1989
Variable Year 1988 Year 1989
Hiring rate of young workers 50.37% 49.34%
Exit rate of older workers 21.62% 20.5%
Share of young workers 38.81% 38.91%
Share of older workers 14.89% 14.94%
Share of women 24.18% 24.6%
Share of CFL contracts 22.4% 21.35%
Share of young rms (less than 8 years) 33.96% 32.92%
Share of small rms
(less than 9 employees) 40% 40.1%
Ratio between the average wage of
youngsters and that of older workers 85.63% 86.97%
Unemployment rate 11.11% 10.84%
Dummy equal to one if the synthetic rms
is declining 23.21% 26.31%
Number of observations 517 517
Source : WHIP (waves 1988 and 1989)
3.2 A di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach
10It means that in this synthetic rm, the number of jobs in the end of the year is lower
that the number of jobs observed in the beginning of the year
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3.2.1 Identication strategy
Let Y Dit , the hiring rate of young workers observed at time t in a local labor
market i in the state D, with D 2 f0; 1g and t 2 f1988; 1989g. The binary
variable D is equal to one if the synthetic rm experienced a decrease in
the exit rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989. In that case, the
synthetic rm is viewed as a treated observation. We have to determine the
e¤ect of the binary treatment on our dependent variable Yit, in other words
we have to estimate the di¤erence Y 1it   Y 0it . However, the estimation of this
di¤erence raises an issue of missing data. Indeed, at time t an observation
i is either treated or not treated and we can not observe simultaneously the
value of the dependent variable for one observation i in the two states D = 0
and D = 1.
To adress this issue, we can determine the average treatment e¤ect on
the treated group using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator denoted by DD
dened in the following way:
DD = fE(YitjD = 1) E(YitjD = 0)g fE(Yit 1jD = 1) E(Yit 1jD = 0)g
The idea is to estimate the gap between the hiring rates of young workers
observed respectively in treated and in control synthetic rms at time t  1
and then to evaluate to what extent this gap has been a¤ected at time t.
However, this method holds only if the time invariance assumption is checked.
This assumption implies that the hiring rate of young workers for the control
group of observations would have evolved between t   1 and t in the same
fashion that the hiring rate for the treated group of observations, in the
event that they had not been exposed to the treatment. The time invariance
assumption may be formulated in the following way:
E(Y 0it   Y 0it 1jD = 0) = E(Y 0it   Y 0it 1jD = 1)
This assumption is particularly strong, given that treated synthetic rms
may di¤er widely of not treated synthetic rms regarding some characteristics
likely to a¤ect hirings of young workers (a known issue that we refer to as
the Ashenfelters dip, 1978). To attenuate this bias, our strategy consists
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in including a set of regressors when computing the di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimator, dening the following model:
Yit = Xit + D +   t + DDD t + ci + "it with "it  N(0; 2) (23)
where Xit is a vector composed of a set of regressors observed in a syn-
thetic rm i at time t, ci is an individual-specic e¤ect, that allows us to
control for unobserved heterogeneity and "it is the error term of our regres-
sion. In our model, we include a calendar e¤ect adding a binary variable  t
equal to one if the time t corresponds to the period when we consider our
treatment, that is the year 1989. We also introduce a binary variable denoted
by D equal to one if the synthetic rm i experienced a decrease in the exit
rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989. Our aim is to estimate
the parameter DD to determine the e¤ect of the interaction between the
variables D and  t on the hiring rate of young workers. In this regression,
the parameter DD is the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator.
3.2.2 Results
We present our results in the table 3. We observe rst that the Pearsons
coe¢ cient is equal to 0.3952. Consequently, our random-e¤ect model is more
relevant than a pooled-OLS regression, given that it allows to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. We also see that the hiring rate of young workers
at time t is strongly correlated with a lot of regressors like the job declining
dummy, the share of young or small rms, the share of young workers or the
share of CFL signed. It implies that the time invariance assumption is not a
priori checked and that we need to control for the characteristics of each local
labour market to examine the e¤ect of the treatment on the treated group.
We nd that the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator DD is not signicant.
We can discuss the relevance of our results given that treated synthetic
rms are denitely not comparable with the control group. For instance,
implementing a simple t-test of di¤erence in means between these two groups
for the job declining dummy, we nd in the table 4 a t-stat equal to  3:3114,
quite higher in absolute value than 1:96. So the probability for the treated
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Table 3: A di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation of the e¤ect of a decrease in
the exit rate among older workers on the hiring rate among youngsters on
the period 1988-1989
Variable Coe¢ cient Standard error
Binary variable  t = 1
if t = 1989 -0.013 0.013
Binary variable D = 1 if the
synthetic rm is treated 0.024 0.016
Interaction term D t 0.007 0.019
Share of young workers 0.3634 0.108
Share of older workers 0.266 0.14
Share of women -0.088 0.046
Share of CFL contracts 0.273 0.05
Share of young rms (less than 8 years) 0.173 0.08
Share of small rms
(less than 9 employees) 0,2 0,058
Ratio between the average wage
of young and that of older workers 0.07 0.037
Unemployment rate 0.156 0.128
Dummy equal to one if the synthetic rms
is declining -0.089 0.013
R2 0.3091
Number of observations 1034
Pearsons coe¢ cient 0.3952
Note : Coe¢ cients have been estimated through a random-e¤ect model. Standard errors
are corrected from the heteroscedasticity bias through the method of White.
Signicativity thresholds :  : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Source : WHIP (waves 1988 and 1989)
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synthetic rms to experience job destruction in 1988 is quite higher than
this probability for synthetic rms of the control group. It may be explained
by the fact that declining sector tend to reduce their hirings, maintaining
their ageing workforce. Consequently, we can not draw clear conclusions of
a simple di¤erence-in di¤erence model due to the heterogeneity of the two
groups regarding their covariates.
Table 4: Di¤erence in means of the job declining dummy in 1988 between
the treated and the control group
Group Observations Mean Standard error
Control 283 0.177 0.023
Treated 234 0.299 0.029
di¤erence -0.0122 t-stat = -3.3114
Source : WHIP wave 1988
Furthermore, in this subsection, we viewed the decrease in the exit rate
among older workers as a binary treatment. It could be interesting to esti-
mate the e¤ect of this decrease on the hirings of young workers, viewing this
decrease as a continuous treatment. On the one hand, this strategy forces us
to keep in our sample only the treated observations. On the other hand, this
approach allows us to separate observations with a low level of treatment
from those with a high level of treatment and to see how the hiring rate of
young workers varies according to the level of the treatment.
Consequently, we use in the next subsection a propensity score matching
procedure and we implement it to a continuous treatment, that is the decrease
in the exit rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989 in absolute value.
3.3 Generalized propensity score matching method
3.3.1 Identication strategy
As mentioned previously, our strategy does not consist in regressing the hir-
ing rate of young workers on absolute value of the decrease in the exit rate
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among older workers. Indeed, even though we include in our model all the
information provided by our database, we are in the face of a selection bias,
in the sense that our explanatory variable of interest may be a¤ected by
a set of observables, likely to be correlated with the error term of our re-
gression. To control for the selection bias through observables, we use a
propensity score matching procedure generalized to a continuous treatment.
As in the binary treatment context, propensity score methods in a setting
with continuous treatment rely heavily on the key assumption that adjust-
ing for pre-treatment di¤erences solve the problem of drawing causal infer-
ence. Formally, we make the weak unconfoundedness assumption, introduced
by Hirano and Imbens (2004), that requires that the treatment assignment
mechanism is conditional independent of each potential outcome given the
pre-treatment variables.
Let us consider a set of N synthetic rms characterized by a vector Xit of
observables, by a number Ti equal to the absolute value of the decrease in the
exit rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989 and by a number Yi()
equal to the hiring rate of young workers, associated with the treatment level
Ti = . Ti is our continuous treatment and Yi is our dependent variable. The
unconfoundedness assumption may be formulated in the following way:
Yi() ? TijXi
Given unconfoundedness, we can apply matching methods based on the
Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) with continuous treatment introduced
by Imbens and Hirano (2004). The GPS is dened as the conditional den-
sity of the actual treatment given the observed covariates. Formally, let
r(; x) = fT jX(jx) be the conditional density of the treatment given the
covariates. Then, the GPS is Ri = r(i; Xi). The GPS is a balancing score,
that is, within strata with the same value of r(; x), the probability that
T = t does not depend on the value of X. In combination with the weak
unconfoundedness assumption, this balancing property implies that:
fT (jr(;Xi); Yi()) = fT (jr(;Xi))
.
As a result, the GPS can be used to eliminate any biases associated with
di¤erences in the covariates. Formally, if the assignment to the treatment is
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weakly unconfounded, given pre-treatment variablesXi, then we can dene in
a second step a specication regressing the conditional mean of our dependent
variable on the value of the treatment Ti and on the value of the generalized
propensity score Ri. In our analysis, we choose a simple linear model dened
in the following way:
E(Y jT = ;R = r) = b0 + b1T + b2R + b3TR (24)
where  and r are specic values of respectively the treatment and the
propensity score.
At last, we have to determine the average causality e¤ect or dose-response
function to evaluate the e¤ect of several values of the treatment on the hiring
rate of young workers. The dose-response function denoted by () may be
formulated in the following way:
() = E[E(Y ()jr(;X)] (25)
In other words we have to estimate ^() such that:
^() =
1
N
NX
i=1
b^0 + b^1 + b^2R^ + b^3R^ (26)
To obtain the dose-response function, we have to calculate ^() for dif-
ferent values of treatment, given that for each value , standard errors are
computed through bootstrapping methods.
3.3.2 Results
The rst step consists in matching our observations calculating the Gen-
eralized Propensity Score (GPS in the remainder of the paper). The GPS
methods are implemented in our application using the gpscore, dose-response
STATA package (Bia & Mattei, 2008). A key assumption in the STATA im-
plemented version of the GPS methods is the normality of the treatment
variable conditional on the pre-treatment covariates. In our study we as-
sume that the Box Cox transformation of the treatment has a Normal
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distribution, given the covariates. Formally, let BoxCox(Ti) denote the Box-
Cox transformation of the treatment variable, we dene BoxCox(Ti) in the
following way:
BoxCox(Ti) =
(
Ti  1

if  6= 0
log(Ti) if  = 0
Using the Shapiro-Wilk test, we check that BoxCox(Ti)jXi  N(0 +
1Xi; 
2
v), where 0, 1 and 
2
v are parameters to be estimated through a
maximum likelihood procedure. So for each observation, the generalized
propensity score is dened in the following way:
R^i =
1
2
p
2
exp(  1
22
[BoxCox(Ti)  0 + 1Xi])
Then, according to the distribution of the values of the treatment, that
is the absolute value of the decrease in the exit rate among older workers
between 1988 and 1989, we divide our sample into di¤erent groups. In our
study, we choose to break down our treatment into four intervals : [0;0.05],
[0.05;0.15], [0.15;0.3] and [0.3;1]. Therefore, at each time t, we divide our
sample into quartiles according to the value of the treatment.
In each of these groups, we calculate the GPS for a treatment level Ti cor-
responding to the median treatment level for each group. We can determine
the GPS of each observation i belonging to the group j, with j = f1; 2; 3; 4g
in the following way:
R^i =
1
2
p
2
exp(  1
22
[BoxCox(T
j
)  0 + 1Xi]
where T
j
is the median treatment level for each group j. According to
the distribution of the GPS in each of these groups, we divide them into K
blocks. Here, we consider 5 blocks. For each block kj, with k = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g,
composed of synthetic rms presenting a specic treatment level correspond-
ing to their group j and a specic GPS corresponding to their block k, we
compare the values of observables with those of observations belonging to
the block kj
00
avec j0 6= j, namely synthetic rms with a similar GPS but a
di¤erent treatment level.
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Prior to evaluate the dose-response function, we have to ensure that the
balancing property is checked. In the table 5, we report the values of the t-
statistic when we carry out a test of di¤erence in means for each explanatory
variable and for di¤erent treatment levels after having adjusted by the GPS.
The idea is to test for each group of observations, dened by a specic treat-
ment interval, whether the observables are similar with those of synthetic
rms of the other groups, after matching. We use the bold case values to
indicate that the t-stat is higher than 1.96. In that case, balancing property
does not hold. We remark in the table 5 that no t-stat values are higher than
1.96. We can conclude that our GPS matching procedure allows us to check
the balancing property.
Table 5: Testing di¤erence between means for di¤erent treatment interval
after adjustment by the GPS
Variables for the year 1988 t-stat for di¤erent
treatment intervals
[0;0.05] [0.05;0.15] [0.15;0.3] [0.3;1]
Share of young workers -0.18 0.34 -1.11 0.781
Share of older workers 0.369 -0.38 0.524 -0.918
Share of women -1.15 1.26 0.01 -0.791
Share of CFL contracts -0.389 0.78 -0.103 0.039
Share of young rms (less than 8 years) -0.11 -0.243 -0.42 0.577
Share of small rms
(less than 9 employees) 0.625 -0.705 -0.235 0.438
Ratio between the average wage of
young and that of older workers 0.364 -1.073 0.494 0.592
Unemployment rate 0.941 -0.77 0.148 -0.252
Dummy equal to one if the synthetic rm
is declining -0.218 0.287 0.205 -0.304
Hiring rate of young workers -0.011 -0.451 0.448 -0.505
Note : the treatment corresponds to the absolute value of the decrease in the exit rate
among older workers between 1988 and 1989 for each synthetic rm.
Bold case values indicate that the t-statistic is higher than 1.96 in absolute value.
Source : WHIP (waves 1988 and 1989)
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Figure 2: Dose-response function of the treatment on the hiring rate of young
workers
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We represent the dose-response function in the gure 2 .
This function describes to what extent a decrease in the exit rate among
older workers has an e¤ect on the hiring rate of young workers. Given that
the treatment is equal to the absolute value of the decrease, a high treatment
level corresponds to a strong fall in exits of older workers. We observe in the
gure 2 that for a treatment level that ranges from 0.1 to 0.4, the treatment
a¤ects slightly the hiring rate of young workers. However, for a dose of
treatment higher than 0.4, we remark that a slowdown in the exits of older
workers has a negative e¤ect on hirings of young workers.
Thus we show empirically that a strong decrease in exits of older workers
reduces sharply hirings of young workers at a local labor market level, which
27
provides some empirical evidence of our theoretical results. Nevertheless, we
have to take these empirical ndings with caution. Indeed, we matched our
observations given a set of observables which allows us to check the balancing
property only for the variables that we include. Therefore we did not correct
for a selection bias on unobservables.
Furthermore, recall that our study has been carried out through a synthetic-
rm approach. It implies that our observations has been built grouping in
a same cell rms belonging to the same sector of activity and located in
the same province. Our approach is therefore strongly inuenced by the
aggregation level chosen to build each synthetic rm.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the e¤ect of delaying retirement age on hirings
of young workers. Our starting point was to consider an imperfect substi-
tutability between young and older workers. We explained the vacancy-chain
pattern, through which an exit of an older worker may involve a new hiring
of a young worker, even though these two types of workers are not perfectly
substitutable for an employer. This vacancy-chain results from job-to-job
ows observed within a local labor market composed of rms belonging to
the same sector of activity, located in the same area and whose jobs require
the same educational level.
In the rst part of the paper, we highlighted the theoretical channels
through which exits of older workers a¤ect hirings of young workers within a
local labor market. In this part, we represented a vacancy-chain in a matching
model with heterogeneous jobs and workers, considering that workers are
either experimented or not and that workers with no experience (i.e. the
young workers) can not apply for a complex job requiring experience. In this
model, to represent a vacancy-chain, we allowed for job-to-job ows from
simple jobs to complex jobs, but only if workers have a su¢ cient level of
professional experience to apply for complex jobs.
We pointed out two main e¤ects of a fall in the exit rate among older
workers on the hiring rate of young workers. First, this decrease lengthens the
horizon of an experienced worker and encourages job creation for both types
of jobs. Second, the increase in complex job creation raises the probability
for an experienced employed job seeker to nd a complex job. Therefore, it
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reduces the average duration of a simple job making rms more reluctant to
open simple jobs and reducing hirings of young workers with no experience.
We show that the net e¤ect of a decrease in the exit rate among older workers
on the hirings of young workers is negative if the ow value to an employer
of a lled complex job is su¢ ciently high.
Then, in the second part of the paper, we have studied empirically the
e¤ect of a slowdown in the exit rate among older workers on the hiring rate
of young workers within a local labor market. We use matched employer-
employee data drawn from the Worker Histories Italian Panel. We considered
a sample of synthetic rms, each of these being composed of rms belonging
to the same sector and located in the same area. We grouped rst our
observations into two categories: synthetic rms that experienced a decrease
in the exit rate among older workers between 1988 and 1989 and those that
did not experience such a decrease during this period. Using a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence approach and controling for characteristics of each synthetic rm,
we showed that a slowdown in the exits of older workers does not exert a
signicative e¤ect on hirings of young workers.
Nevertheless, we pointed out that some variables di¤er greatly among
the two groups and therefore a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis has no
sense, because it implies a strong selection bias. Consequently, keeping in
our sample only synthetic rms that experienced a decrease in the exit rate
among older workers between 1988 and 1989 and matching observations each
other adjusting by the generalized propensity score to correct for the selection
bias on observables, we found that a strong decrease in the exit rate among
older workers reduces signicatively the hiring rate of young workers within a
local labor market. However, we have to take our results with caution given
that our matching method does not allow us to correct for a selection bias
on unobservables. Furthermore, our ndings may depend on the aggregation
level chosen to build our synthetic rms. To test the robustness of our results,
we shoud reproduce this study on very big rms assimilating job-to-job ows
to promotions within the rm.
One extension of this paper may come to mind. We could allow for both
types of worker mobility, within a local labor market, through job-to-job
ows and within a rm, through internal promotions. This specication
could allow us to better grasp channels through which a decrease in the exit
rate among older workers a¤ects the hiring rate among young workers. We
leave this idea for further investigation.
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Appendix
Rearranging terms of L(S; ), we obtain the following equation:
L(S; ) =
(yS   w)[
h
(yC wC)
cC(r++)
i
+ ] + (r +  + )(yS   w)
[r +  +
h
(yC wC)
cC(r++)
i
+ ](r +  + )
  c
S
q(S)
= 0
Di¤erentiating L(S; ) we get:
L1d
S + L2d = 0, d
S
d
=  L2
L1
where Li is the partial derivative of L(
S; ) with respect to its ith ele-
ment, with i 2 f1; 2g. We determine L1 = @L(S; )=@S
L1 =
[(yS   w)[
h
(yC wC)
cC(r++)
i
+ ] @
@S
[r +  +
h
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cC(r++)
i
+ ](r +  + )
  cS(S) 1
We have to determine the sign of @=@S. We remark that:
1

= 1 +
p(S)
[ + p(S) + p(C) + ]( + )
As the second term on the right-hand side of the equation is increasing
with S, we deduce that  is decreasing with S. Consequently, L1 < 0.
Furthermore, let E(JS) be the the esperance of the expected income ows
to an employer from a lled simple job such that:
E(JS) =
(yS   w)[p(C) + ] + (r +  + )(yS   w)
[r +  + p(C) + ](r +  + )
where p(C) = (y
C wC)
cC(r++)
. Consequently, L2 has the same sign as @E(JS)=@.
We consider the logarithm of the expression to simplify calculation so:
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ln[E(JS)] = ln[(yS   w)[p(C) + ] + (r +  + )(yS   w)]
  ln[r +  + p(C) + ]  ln(r +  + )
So, di¤erentiating this expression with respect to , we obtain:
@ lnE(JS)
@
=
[@p(
C)
@
+ 1] + @
@
[p(C) + ]
[p(C) + ] + (r +  + )
  [
@p(C)
@
+ 1]
[r +  + p(C) + ]
= [
@p(C)
@
+ 1][
1
[p(C) + ] + (r++)

  1
p(C) +  + r + 
]
+
@
@
[p(C) + ]
[p(C) + ] + (r +  + )
Recall that:
1

= 1 +
p(S)
[ + p(S) + p(C) + ]( + )
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to , we obtain:
@( 1

)
@
=  p(
S)
( + )
( + p(S) + p(C) +  + [1 + @p(
C)
@
])
([ + p(S) + p(C) + ])2
We observe that:
p(C) + 
@p(C)
@
=
(yC   wC)
cC(r +  + )
  (y
C   wC)
cC(r +  + )2
Substituting this expression into the previous one, we obtain:
@( 1

)
@
=  p(
S)
( + )
(2 + p(S) +  + (y
C wC)
cC(r++)
[1  
(r++)
])
([ + p(S) + p(C) + ])2
< 0
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In addition, given that  < 1 + 
(r+)
, we deduce that:
[
1
[p(C) + ] + (r++)

  1
p(C) +  + r + 
] < 0
Consequently, @ ln(E(JS)=@ > 0 only if
[
@p(C)
@
+ 1] < 0, (yC   wC) > cC(r +  + )2
If this condition holds, it ensures that L2 > 0 and therefore @
S=@ > 0.
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